special reference, of course, to physician manpower and to manpower policy. We will have to range outside the narrow perspective of manpower supply and demand. The rnedical care system and its various facets are interrelated. Policies in one arena affect policies elsewhere. A full and comprehensive treatment of physician manpower would have to address issues of organization, reimbursement, regionalization, taxation, and financing. A full treatment could not ignore medical research, medical education, and even such things as urban, transportation, and migration policies. What physicians do and how they do it is influenced by a large number of variables. We shall try to touch upon some of these matters; others, however, will necessarily be omitted. Though I would like to support President Reagan's efforts to increase American productivity by producing the same product in less time, I cannot convert an entire course into a brief lecture simply by speaking more rapidly.
Two additional brief comments need to be made. First, let me note that in speaking of economics, I do not imply that other social science disciplines have little to offer in understanding American medicine and American health care policy with regard to manpower. I emphasize the economic dimension not because, in the words of Paul Samuelson, "Economics is the queen of the social sciences," but, rather, because I happen to be an economist. Second, many of you will perhaps find much of what I will say intuitively obvious. If so, take heart. In the words of M. Jourdain, "Good heavens! For more than forty years I have been speaking prose without knowing it." Many of you have been thinking, perhaps even speaking, economics without knowing it. You should not find this troubling, though I would hope that if you think and speak economics you will do it well; that is, that your vocabulary be richer than the two words "supply" and "demand." There are many places where one could begin our story; many fram.eworks within which we could paint our picture. Let me begin by reminding ourselves of the important difference between the services that physicians produce or offer and the goods and services produced elsewhere in the economy. That difference is important in understanding the special characteristics that encompass the delivery of health care. Today we hear it argued that the problems in medicine, including the problem of rising prices and increasing expenditures, can be solved by making medicine more like other parts of our economy-by increasing competition and strengthening competitive markets. The efficacy of any such solution, however, hinges on the similarities and on the differences between medical care and other goods and services. Those similarities and differences bear examination. They also bear examination because, whether or not one agrees with the conclusions of the Report of the Graduate Medical Education National Advisory Committee (GMENAC), those differences provide the presumed justification for the existence of such a report. After all, even before asking whether GMENAC is right or wrong, we have the right to ask, Why GMENAC at all? The federal government does not issue such reports for every occupation. It does not, for example, call upon law schools, schools of social work, and schools of education to cut back their enrollments. GMENAC exists because some people believe that medicine is different.
The first point to be noted is that physicians' services are services. They are not goods produced in factories, boxed and shipped to various distribution centers, put up on shelves, or kept in inventory awaiting buyers. The medical care industry would be much more readily understood and would operate very differently if physicians' services could be produced, shipped or stored, and distributed like Kellogg's corn flakes. I recall vividly the important difference that hit home when I served at successive intervals as a member of two public commissions. The first dealt with hunger and malnutrition in the United States. The Board of Inquiry met for a period of time, reviewed the relevant data, and considered how to make it possible for people without sufficient income to have enough food. The options were relatively clear: one could give people food; one could give people money which they might use to buy food; and one could give people some form of currency (call it food stamps, if you will) that they could use to buy food but only food. At no point in the life of the Commission did we have to address the question, If people had the wherewithal to buy the food, would there be food stores in their community? At no point did we consider the need for special programs to train food store managers or to induce such individuals to move to West Virginia or other areas where people were hungry. Of course, I do not mean to imply that the market for food is fully competitive. I am aware that prices in some food stores in areas of poverty are higher than those charged for equivalent goods in suburbia. I am aware that there are differences in the quality of fruits, vegetables, and meat in different parts of the same city, but the essential problem of obtaining enough food seemed to us the problem of income, not of food distribution system reform.
Some years later I served on a commission that dealt with the problem of health care in America: how to improve access to care. Of course, we addressed the fact that poverty represented a barrier to care. We discussed how that barrier might be reduced. We were aware that there are federal programs like Medicaid that will pay for the care that is obtained, and we discussed whether these programs were equitable and efficient. But our agenda encompassed a broad area that the commission on hunger did not need to address. The commission on health care could not assume that if we gave people in West Virginia the money or the stamps or the Medicaid assistance that would enable them to purchase care that care would be available. Kellogg will ship corn flakes to Appalachia if people have the currency with which to buy corn flakes, but physicians' services cannot be shipped to Appalachia. It is not enough for West Virginia to have a Medicaid program. Medical services must be produced by people, many of whom are professionals, on the spot and that means that we have to be certain that there are enough professionals and that the incentive structures will induce them to locate where they are needed. Professional services are produced by professionals. Professionals have their own needs and tastes and wants. These affect their distribution and their distribution, in turn, determines the availability of care.
Physicians, though professionals, are different from many other professionals. Most physicians are self-employed. This is in sharp contrast to the situation facing other Americans and other professionals. The vast majority of the students with whom you went to college are, or will be, working for someone else. They will be employed and that means they will look for jobs and try to find some firm that is prepared to hire them. They will prefer certain locations and certain firms, but they may find that they must compromise. A student who studied the violin and who likes Boston may apply for work with the Boston Symphony Orchestra, but the BSO does not stand ready to hire every qualified violinist who would like to be a member of the Orchestra. And so the budding violinist may give up the dream of Boston and accept employment with the Hartford Symphony. Alternatively, enamored of Boston, unwilling to leave, he or she may give up the violin and drive a cab. Most Americans face a job market. Some firm, constrained by a budget, must hire them. Though we may not be happy with the way the game plays out, we do not consider the influence of the market an abridgement of our freedom. We hear of the phenomenon of overdoctoring; we do not hear of a similar phenomenon, overplant storing. Physicians can, and data show they do, affect the level of demand for their services. Of course one can argue with the data, as I suppose is true with all data. Does the fact that we have more neurosurgeons and more neurosurgery than does Britain mean that perhaps they don't have enough? Nevertheless, the conclusion is clear. Given the variability among both patients and physicians, given the lack of knowledge on the part of patients, given an attitude that more must mean better, physicians have an opportunity to affect the level of demand. Finally, given the way most physicians derive their income, in particular from a feefor-service mechanism that gives special rewards to procedures and far fewer rewards to time, many physicians respond to the incentive structures by increasing utilization.
Economists and students of the health care system may decry this phenomenon and may suggest that it leads to waste, but economists are sensitive to the fact that one man's waste is another man's income. Waste is not something that can be easily cut out. It is not the strip of fat on the edge of a steak; it is the marbleized fat ingrained in the meat itself. That which is fat in the medical system is also deeply ingrained in the very structures and organization of medical care.
And so it is that physicians, to a significant degree, have been able to escape both the discipline of looking for ajob and finding someone who wants to hire them within a budget and the discipline of a market where consumers use current income to buy that which, in their judgment, will provide them satisfaction commensurate with the expenditure. Physicians have been free to select their patients, to select their specialty, and to select their location.
We can make the story even more complete by noting that the structure for payment of medical care services is heavily influenced by the existence of insurance.
Insurance and third-party payment removes discipline from the patient. My statement that people spend money on other goods and services in relation to the satisfaction that those goods and services bring to the costs of those services has few analogies in medicine. On the one hand, patients know very little about medical care, cannot predict what might happen in the absence of care, cannot balance their impressions against the comments by experts in white coats, believe they may be dealing with matters of life and death. On the other hand, with third-party payment, good. This is not the place to amplify the implications of third-party payments; nevertheless, I cannot leave the subject without invoking a rule that I set for myself when I first entered teaching. I had just read a short, whimsical article by Heywood Broun reprinted in a collected edition of his works. Broun discussed how he became (what he called) a "red." It seems that he was taking a two-semester course in what Broun called "radical panaceas and their underlying fallacies" at Harvard. In the fall and winter semester, a series of guest lecturers were invited to speak to the class.
There were anarchists, syndicalists, socialists, single-taxers, and the like. Broun apparently was quite impressed by the failings of the capitalist system. In the spring and summer semester, the faculty member spent the lecture hours tearing apart the presentations that had been offered in the fall. But, as your President is aware, the Boston Red Sox had quite a team (including Tris Speaker) in the spring of 1908. Broun spent his time at the ball park. He didn't attend class and never heard the answers to the radical arguments: "I went out into the world the fervent follower of all things red, including the Boston Red Sox." And so I invoked a rule: never say anything that is wrong in the first half of the class with the intention of correcting it in the second half. Some students will be at the ballgame and others will surely have fallen asleep. They will not hear the correction. So, though I will not discuss the matter fully, I must note that my remarks on third-party payment should not cause some of you to leap to a wrong conclusion: that Fein advocates the abolition of insurance or at least advocates higher deductibles and higher coinsurance as a way to make consumers price-conscious. I do not believe that the problems that American medicine faces can be cured by that device-and certainly cannot be cured while retaining what degree of equity we have achieved.
Back, then, to our story. If physicians face few constraints in assuring a demand for their services, if they face consumers who are loath to question authority, if they do not compete vigorously in regard to price, if the ethics of the profession abjure advertising, the competitive market conditions that, on occasion, are found elsewhere in the economy are absent. Furthermore, the modes of payment, the role of government as a third-party payer, the concern on the part of government with the health and welfare of the people-all these and more-have created a situation in which government has pursued a variety of public policies designed to affect the provision of medical care: aid to medical schools, assistance to students, a National Health Service Corps, health planning, loans to fledgling health maintenance organizations, PSROs, a National Center for Health Statistics, a National Center for Health Services Research, a National Center for Health Care Technology, and so forth. All of these stand in sharp contrast to the competitive marketplace.
These various public programs have expanded in recent years. In part, the expansion reflects the expansion of government itself, the growth of congressional staffs, the multiple committees that deal with health matters in both House and Senate. In part, however, it reflects an increasing concern, a preoccupation, if you will, with health care expenditures and their impact on the federal budget, largely through Medicare and Medicaid. I do not believe that it is an exaggeration if I suggest that the critical dimension used in assessing almost each and every possible government health activity is no longer the possible impact on the health of the population or on equity in the provision of health care. The critical dimension has become the proposal's possible impact on health care expenditures and on the federal budget. We march under a cost-control banner. This phenomenon did not begin with David Stockman. If one traces the history of Professional Standards Review Organizations, if one examines the language used in recent years concerning health planning and the criteria developed to assess its accomplishments, one finds a preoccupation with health care costs. Indeed, I believe that much, though by no means all, of the interest in the GMENAC Report stems from a concern about health care expenditures.
The GMENAC Report, of course, is not the first report on physician manpower. Concern with the aggregate supply of physicians has a long history. I commend to you the introductory material and first chapter of the Flexner Report, now 70 years old. The nature of the discussion, however, has changed-and almost cyclically. Flexner was concerned about overproduction of physicians (and, of course, about the large number of poorly trained physicians). The Lee-Jones Study, almost 50 years ago, was concerned about a shortage of physicians. The Report by President Truman's Commission on the Health Needs of the Nation, almost 30 years ago, focused on distributional considerations (exclusively, geographic) and concluded that it could not determine the dimensions of the shortage. The Surgeon General's Consultant Group on Medical Education-which some in this audience may remember as the Bane Committee-reporting 20 years ago, concluded that it would be virtually impossible for the U.S. to maintain the existing physician-population ratio (then at 141 and now at 171 physicians per 100,000 population) given the projected population growth and output of medical schools.
The most recent report is the Graduate Medical Education National Advisory Committee (GMENAC) Report issued in the fall of 1980. It projects a supply of 535,000, a physician-population ratio of 220, and a surplus of 70,000 physicians in 1990 and a supply of 643,000, a ratio of 247, and a surplus of 145,000 physicians in the year 2000. The year 2000 seems distant but it isn't. The year 2000 is only as far from today as today is from the inauguration of John F. Kennedy. In spite of all that has happened since, for many of us that is yesterday.
If we examine the various reports and their very different projections of the future, we cannot help but be struck by the varying definitions of shortage and surplus and by the varying methodologies employed in making projections. In general, however, the projections attempted to assess the balance between future supply and future needs (or what GMENAC calls "requirements"). Supply was typically measured by a head count (more correctly, a degree count)-how many M.D.s were there and how many would there be. Except for the Lee-Jones Study, future needs were assessed by extrapolating physician-population ratios for the nation or for well-endowed regions. Naturally this gave tremendous weight to population projections.
Clearly such projections of physician supply, of shortages and surpluses, were very primitive. They assumed existing financing mechanisms, the current organization and patterns of care, stable hours and productivity, few advances in medical knowledge, and so forth. They ignored possible changes in disease patterns, in states of health (say, as a result of changes in living conditions and economic well being), and in demand for care (say, as a result of rising income and the spread of insurance). They assumed that future needs and demands (the ability to convert need into the desire and ability to purchase health care services in the marketplace) were stable. Most important, they focused on the supply and need for personnel, not on the supply and need for medical services which, after all, can be produced in varying ways, with different kinds of personnel, and with the substitution of capital for labor.
Economists tend to be suspicious of such projections. We do not assume stable production functions for health or for other goods and services. We do not believe that production systems are, or need to be, rigid and inflexible. Thus, whatever my general skepticism concerning the validity and utility of occupational projections for planning purposes, I am not prepared to argue that health care planning can or should be replaced by a reliance on the market, on signals sent by a thermometer that is inappropriate-inappropriate because the market does not function in a competitive fashion and because, even if it were to do so, market solutions would not assure an equitable distribution of health care services. Nor do I suggest that manpower planning can be done by individual schools, that there is no place for federal planning. There is a federal stake, and it does not derive solely from the presence of federal dollars for education, research, and payment for services. The aggregate supply of manpower and its geographic and specialty distributions do affect access to care, and the federal government has been and ought to be concerned with equity in access. Government is not only about cutting budgets and about costs and expenditures. It is also about distribution and fairness and justice-about how to share the fruits of progress and how to bear the pain of sacrifice-what Howard Cossell would call the ecstasy of victory and the agony of defeat.
But if, for all the reasons already cited, the market does not send us the correct signals about the aggregate supply of physicians, should we accept the GMENAC recommendations as a substitute for market information? I would urge caution and would do so on the basis of two considerations: (1) the GMENAC Report has a number of technical forecasting problems that I do not believe are fully resolved by the statistical manipulations contained therein; (2) the GMENAC Report, in my view, fails to specify the nature of the problem, that is, the presumed disadvantages of a physician surplus, and does not ask whether those specific disadvantages can be addressed in ways other than by restricting entry to the profession. Nor does it address the possible social costs that may accompany a restriction of entry.
Though the technical problems inherent in projections are interesting and important, I will not dwell on them. I believe that, in the limited time at our disposal, it would be more interesting and more fruitful to examine the latter issue. Even so, a few words on the numbers are in order. It is clear that it is almost inevitable that in projecting the future we are governed by the present. The question is, How adequate are present conditions? Can we expect and do we want present patterns of practice to continue in the future? I believe we ought to be prepared for a decline in the physician's average number of hours worked per week and even in the number of patients seen per hour. Today, almost half of all ambulatory office visits are less than ten minutes in duration. Perhaps, before we readily accept a cutback in enrollments, we should discuss the kind of medical care we would like to see delivered. Perhaps we should encourage a growth in physician supply, a growth that-if fees were restructured-would encourage longer rather than shorter visits.
But those remarks relate to the projected numbers. I would prefer we focus on more basic questions. Let us begin by asking what lies behind the concern about a surplus. I would suggest that the GMENAC Report, though it does not state the problem explicitly, is concerned about costs, the costs of educating "unnecessary" personnel and the cost of medical care such personnel will help generate. The important paragraph in the Report reads:
There will be too many physicians in 1990. There will be substantial imbalances in some specialties. There will continue to be a marked unevenness in the geographic distribution of physicians. The country may be training too many nonphysician providers for 1990. The factors influencing specialty choices are complex. The actual cost of graduate medical education is unknown. Economic motivation in specialty and geographic choice is uncertain.
I regret that the Report does not tell us what "too many" means. I infer, however, that part of the problem, though perhaps not all of it, is that too many means it will be too expensive; that is, we will face unnecessary costs in educating personnel and in delivering services. On the first matter, I can only regret that the financing of medical education in the United States remains a bizarre and inconsistent improvisation. In spite of a series of good, bad, and mediocre reports-every approach has been attempted-federal policy remains incoherent and incomplete. It takes little account of the complex relationships between teaching, research, and service and between undergraduate and graduate medical education. One can only sympathize with students and faculty who face a set of health manpower policies and programs that are buffeted by exogenous variables and that are developed in a less than coherent fashion. Indeed, the situation is so unstable that, on occasion, faculty members even find themselves sympathizing with those who must lead medical schools and who must be concerned about budgets-that is, with Deans.
The issues in the financing of medical education are many and complex, and the federal role needs examination. It does not make sense for taxpayers, many of whom are of low income, to support the training of people who may not be needed but who will earn high incomes. But if that is the expense we are concerned about, the answer need not lie in cutting the number of students; rather, it may lie in new ways of financing medical education itself.
Similarly, the answer to the fear of ever-rising expenditures on medical care may lie in changes in fee schedules, including the imbalance between payments for services provided in inpatient and outpatient settings and the relative payment levels among specialties and in the various geographic areas. How much and how physicians are paid and reimbursed for their various activities affects the distribution of care, the nature of those activities, and total costs. In my own view, the cost problem should be addressed in a manner that would integrate the costs of medical education and the future incomes of physicians. I would find merit in free medical education and lower future incomes. I recognize of course that others may disagree and, in any case, that that does not solve all the problems.
Unfortunately, however, the policy recommendations in the GMENAC Report do not deal effectively with financing issues, and this in spite of the fact that many who read the Report will accept its recommendations because of their concern with dollars. Nor does the Report offer a realistic set of proposals designed to alter the geographic or specialty distribution. Nor is there adequate analysis of how the substantial cutbacks in enrollment called for would affect distributional considerations. In the past, I have written that surpluses do not ensure that distributional problems will be solved, that creating physicians because Appalachia or Harlem are without sufficient services will not bring those physicians and their services to Appalachia or Harlem. Nevertheless, policies to deal with maldistribution are easier to develop and implement in a loose rather than in a tight market. One does not have to believe in the efficacy of trickle-down theories to suggest that recent social history documents only too well that redistribution is easier to accomplish when an economy and when a sector within that economy are growing than when the economy or the particular sector is stable or declining.
Nor is the distribution of practitioners the only distributional issue that demands our concern. If medical schools reduce enrollments, it will be that much more difficult to improve the representation of various income and minority groups in these smaller student bodies. A restriction of enrollment is synonymous with a restriction of educational opportunity. Whatever the problems created by having "too many" physicians, it would be helpful to be equally explicit about the difficulties associated with a less ample supply. It may be that if we ranked the difficulties involved in having too many and the difficulties involved in having a less ample supply that we would choose to have too many rather than too few.
What I have suggested is that manpower supply cannot be looked at without considering the whole environment of medical practice. Having said that, let me be clear that the problem does not lie in the fact that Dr. Tarlov and his colleagues missed the point. The problem lies elsewhere. The Congress and the Executive Branch have preferred to use partial models and have preferred to ignore side effects, organizational and financing issues. Though the key issues involve the socioeconomic environment of medical practice, the federal government has been unwilling to deal directly with these issues. To address the socioeconomic environment of medical practices means, among other things, to take on a most difficult political fight with the profession. In order to increase the probability of winning that fight, the government would have to do a better job than it has done in the past of explaining the issues and of educating the public. Unwillingness to deal directly with the issues has generated a greater and greater frustration. In the lashing out that accompanies that frustration, we have witnessed (and I suspect will continue to witness) more and more attempts to control medical schools and to control entry into the profession. Thus, my quarrel with GMENAC does not lie in what it was asked to do as much as it lies in the context in which the questions were asked and in the fact that a number of other questions were omitted.
Those questions are difficult to ask and difficult to answer. They relate to the structure of American medicine. To ask them requires that we recognize that we have been engaged in a remarkable experiment in the United States, an experiment in which the government expresses its concern for health care by enacting a variety of programs and by funding Medicare and Medicaid but is unwilling to regulate effectively the delivery system. Such an experiment is probably doomed to failure. It is likely not to be fully effective in improving access and health care and, at the same time, is likely to be very expensive. A control mechanism is required and two such mechanisms have been suggested: one approach argues that the necessary control mechanism can be obtained through the creation of competitive markets; the other approach has argued that the control mechanism can be built into a national health insurance program. These two contrasting views will continue to be debated.
Medicine will continue to interact and intersect with economics. The issues are not resolved. It is to be hoped that the public, that the profession, that the Executive Branch and the Congress will learn more about the subtleties and nuances of the economic organization of medicine. In my view, only if that occurs can we be optimistic that the solutions we choose will have a greater probability of successful implementation. American medicine is not healthy, but it is not going to be made stronger by treating the wrong patient with a partial therapy for a misdiagnosed ailment.
